The Masechta opens by listing close relatives with whom yibum is not allowed — including cases of eishes ach (a brother’s wife) outside the mitzvah of yibum. This immediately raises the core question: How can yibum ever work? Yibum is, by definition, marrying an eishes ach, which is normally an issur punishable by kares. Tosfos based on Kovetz He’aros 9 Yibum works through the rule of aseh docheh lo sa’aseh — a positive mitzvah overriding a prohibition. The issur of eishes ach remains fully in place; it is simply overridden in this scenario. Tosafos asks: If yibum overrides ervah, why not apply it to other forbidden relatives, like a wife's sister? Tosafos answers: Yibum is allowed only because the Torah explicitly commands it. The override applies only here, nowhere else. Yad Ramah’s Approach (Sanhedrin 53a): Yibum is not based on aseh docheh lo sa’aseh. Rather, the Torah’s prohibition of eishes ach never applied to a case where yibum is possible. The issur applies only when the woman has children and yibum is off the table. Ramban’s View (Toras Ha’adam): Agrees with the Yad Ramah. Compares it to a kohen becoming tamei for a mes mitzvah: it’s not an exception — that case simply wasn’t included in the original prohibition. So too, eishes ach simply doesn’t apply in a scenario of yibum. Nafka Minas (Practical Differences Between the Views): Kiddushin with a Yevama: Rashi says kiddushin cannot take effect, because the issur of eishes ach still exists (fits with Tosafos/Rav Elchonon). According to Ramban/Yad Ramah, kiddushin might work, since eishes ach isn’t present at all in a yibum case. Yibum for the Wrong Reasons: The Gemara warns it’s like living with an ervah. Rambam says it’s not actually an ervah at all — once the brother dies, the issur disappears. Rambam fits with Ramban: the issur is simply gone in a yibum case. Tosafos/Rashi fit the stricter language of the Gemara — the issur exists but is overridden. This sugya sets up a major theme of Yevamos: Is yibum an override of eishes ach, or is eishes ach simply not present when the Torah commands yibum?

Yevamos 4b: גדר איסור כלאים: מעשה לבישה או הנאת לבישה This episode analyzes the precise geder ha-issur of shaatnez: What, at its core, does the Torah prohibit? The Gemara establishes that shaatnez is forbidden only when there is both levishah and hana’ah, which creates a central chakirah: Is the prohibition fundamentally the benefit one receives from shaatnez, with wearing serving merely as the mechanism for that benefit? Or is the essence the act of wearing shaatnez, with the requirement of hana’ah simply defining which act of wearing rises to the level of issur? Rashi’s explanation suggests that hana’ah might be the central ingredient, and this has major implications for tzitzis. If mitzvos are not classified as personal enjoyment (mitzvos lav le’hanos nitnu), does that mean the prohibition of shaatnez never starts in a mitzvah setting? Or does the halachic act of levishah remain fully present, requiring a formal Torah-based allowance even when no physical pleasure is intended?

החקירה: האם איסורי נזיר מוגדרים כדין השוה בכל — דומיא דנדרים המחייבים כל אדם לשמור את מוצא שפתיו — או שהם דינים הנובעים מ“שם תואר” של נזיר, ואינם שייכים אלא למי שחלה עליו קדושת נזירות? --- The Core Question The sugya depends on defining the very nature of Nazirus: > Is Nazirus fundamentally like a neder (a universal halachic mechanism)? Or is it a unique halachic status — a “shem toar” — that the Torah applies only to someone who assumes the role of a Nazir? This distinction determines whether Nazir prohibitions are considered “equal to all” (שוה בכל) or “not equal to all” (אינו שוה בכל). --- Side A – Nazirus is like a Neder (Issur Cheftza or Issur Gavra) According to the Mahar"i Ben Lev and Mahar"i Basan: When a person accepts Nazirus, he is creating an issur, either: On the object (wine becomes forbidden), or On the person (the person becomes prohibited from cutting hair or drinking wine). Result: The mechanism is the same mechanism as nedarim, which applies to everyone. Therefore, even those who never became Nazirīm are bound by the same underlying halachic system: → Nazir prohibitions count as “שוה בכל.” --- Side B – Nazirus is a Halachic Status (“Shem Teva”) According to the Mahariṭ: Nazirus is not an issur-object and not an issur-person in the neder sense. It is a new kedusha-status placed on a person: → The Torah gives special prohibitions only to one who possesses this status. Result: These laws apply only to people with that status. Therefore: → Nazir prohibitions are “אינו שוה בכל.” --

This episode presents Rav Akiva Eiger’s classic kasha on Tzaras Tzarah: why does the Torah require a special pasuk of “litzror” to asser the second co-wife? Once the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she would seem to carry the full status of an ervah, and an ervah ordinarily extends its halachic effect to a co-wife automatically. What, then, necessitates a new pasuk? Rav Nachum’s yesod provides the framework: the halachos of yibbum operate within two distinct categories—issur and ptur mitzvah. An ervah does not merely forbid; she removes the mitzvah of yibbum and thereby creates a ptur that applies to her tzarah. Eishes Ach, however, is a pure issur—and precisely the issur overridden by yibbum. An issur of this type has no koach to generate a ptur for another woman. Accordingly, even when the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she remains within the realm of issur and cannot affect her fellow co-wife. Without the pasuk, the Tzaras Tzarah would remain permitted. The pasuk is thus indispensable. This episode articulates Rav Akiva Eiger’s kasha and Rav Nachum’s yesod as two sides of the same structure, defining why only an ervah—through ptur—can extend to a tzarah, and why Eishes Ach cannot.

This episode lays out the fundamental chakirah in the sugya of עשה דוחה לא תעשה: when an aseh overrides a lav, what is the precise geder of that override? One model understands the mechanism as דחויה—the lav remains a full-fledged prohibition, but the aseh possesses greater halachic force and therefore pushes it aside (dacheihu) at the moment of conflict. The issur exists, but it is overridden due to the priority of kiyum aseh over shev v’al ta’aseh of the lav. The second model views the system as הותרה—that the lav simply does not apply (lo chal klal) in any situation where the Torah demands fulfillment of the competing aseh. According to this understanding, the Torah never spoke its lo sa’aseh in the context of a mitzvas aseh; the prohibition is absent rather than suppressed. This chakirah produces major nafka minos: • Whether we say aseh docheh lo sa’aseh even באפשר לקיים שניהם, if it is technically possible to satisfy both without conflict. • Whether one may lechatchilah create a situation that will require aseh docheh, or whether doing so improperly forces a dichuyah. • Whether, in cases of lav + aseh standing against an aseh (where the override cannot operate), the lav is still considered chal for malkus, or whether it is treated as nitcheh and therefore exempt from punishment. This section thus defines the underlying conceptual infrastructure of the rule: is aseh docheh lo sa’aseh an act of halachic force, where the mitzvah actively overrides, or an act of halachic definition, where the lav never attains status in that setting to begin with?

It’s a common and surprisingly tricky scenario—you live in Israel and keep one day of Yom Tov, but your guest is visiting from the Diaspora and keeps two days. It’s your Chol HaMoed, their second Yom Tov—can you cook for them? This isn’t just a yes-or-no halachic question. There are two sides, and the topic raises a fascinating halachic and hashkafic discussion about respecting others’ observance and the boundaries of Yom Tov laws in Israel vs. the Diaspora. In this episode, we break it down clearly: • What are the opinions? • What are the options? • And what’s the best way to approach it in real life? Tune in for a quick but deep dive into a relatable Chol HaMoed scenario.

היעדר מלקות על מלאכה בחול המועד אינו רק שאלה טכנית, אלא מגלה פתח לעיון בעצם מהות האיסור: מה טיבו של איסור מלאכה בימי חולו של מועד? האם הוא מדאורייתא גמור, או שמא מדרבנן בלבד? ואם מן התורה הוא – מדוע אין בו עונש מלקות? נעמוד על דברי הגמרא, ונעמיק בדברי הרמב"ן, התוספות, הריטב"א ועוד ראשונים, שביארו כי עצם השאלה אם לוקין תלויה בגדרו של האיסור – האם הוא לאו ממש, או שמא מכלל מצוות עשה של שמירת החג? נעסוק גם בלשון הפסוקים – "ושמרת את חג המצות" – האם היא נאמרה כלאו, כרמז, או כלשון של אזהרה כללית? פרק זה נוגע בשורש הסוגיא: האם איסור מלאכה בחול המועד דומה לשבת ויום טוב, או שמא יש לו אופי אחר לחלוטין – איסור שיסודו בקדושת הזמן, אך דינו קל יותר? עיון למדני שדורש הבנה עמוקה בדברי הראשונים – ולומד מתוך השמטה של מלקות את עצם מהותו של האיסור.